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NOTES
STATE STATUTES AND THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE-
HUGHES v. FETTER
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution' has commonly
been regarded as concerned only with the enforcement of foreign judgments
between the states of the Union. 2 The numerous cases which have come
before the Supreme Court have dealt almost exclusively with the "judicial
Proceedings" phrase of the clause,3 while the words "public Acts" and
1. The clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CoNsT. Art.
IV, § 1. Congress is then given the power to "prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Prior to
1948 the statutes provided a means of authentication and that the "records and judicial
proceedings" should be given the same faith and credit in other jurisdicitions as they
have where enacted. See Rav. STAT. § 905 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1946) and REv.
STAT. § 906 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 688 (1946). In 1948, however, the word "acts" was
included. See 62 STAT. § 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1948). This statutory
change may have the effect of greatly broadening the Court's control over the effect
to be given in the forum to a foreign statute. See Cheatham, A Federal Nation and
Conflict of Laws, 22 RocKY MT. L. REv. 109, 114 (1950) ; Goodrich, Yielding Place
to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws, 50 COL. L. Rav. 881, 891 (1950).
But in its most recent case the Court "found it unnecessary" to place any reliance on
the amended statute in reaching its decision although it had a direct bearing on the
issue. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 n.16, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822
(1951). Several writers have felt that a more explicit legislative program by Congress
would alleviate many of the problems raised by the full faith and credit clause. See
CooK, LOGICAL AND LzGAL BASES OF THE CoNFLict OF LAWS 91 (1949) ; Field, Judicial
Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 12 MINN. L. REv. 439
(1928); Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA. L.
REV. 557 (1943); Note, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes, 45 YALE L.J. 339 (1935).
2. See Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 371
(1933) ; Field, supra note 1, at 439; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required
for Public Acts, 24 ILL. L. REV. 383 (1929) ; Note, 45 YALE L.J. 339 (1935).
3. The requirement that a money judgment must first be obtained in the sister
state and then sued on in an action of debt in the forum state has been criticised as a
wasteful procedure. It is contended that this problem can be solved by allowing the
foreign judgment to be executed directly in the forum. See Cook, The Powers of
Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919) ; Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the, Constitution, 45 COL. L. REv. 1
(1945).
The forum must enforce the judgment even though it is based upon a cause of
action that is not permitted in that state and is against its public policy. Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908), is the leading case; Mississippi
was required to give full faith and credit to a judgmen rendered in Missouri upon a
gambling debt made in Mississippi where it was illegal. See 2 BEALE, CONmcrr OF
LAws § 446.1 (1935).
The two main grounds of attack allowed the defendant in the forum are: (1)
,whether or not the rendering state had jurisdiction, and (2) whether or not the judg-
ment is based on a penal law. STUMBERG, CONFLICr OF LAWS c. 5 (2d ed. 1951) ; Jack-
son, supra note 3, at 8. The argument against enforcing judgments based on penal
laws has been weakened somewhat by the case of Milwaukee County v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80 L. Ed. 220 (1935), where full faith and credit
was required for a judgment based on a revenue law of a sister state. Cf. Huntington v.
Attrall, 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892). See Hazelwood, Full
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"Records" have been, for the most part, left untapped as a source of de-
cisional law. It has only been in recent years that the Supreme Court has
broadened its approach by applying the full faith and credit clause to the
legislative acts of the states as well as to judgments.
4
Historically the statutes of sister states have not been conclusively
shown to have been intended for inclusion in the words "public Acts,"
but there is general agreement today that they were so included.5 How-
ever, except for one early dictum, 6 there was no Supreme Court holding
supporting this proposition until the turn of the century. Since that time
until June of 1951 the Supreme Court had held that the clause applied to
legislative acts in only three groups of cases.
The first group dealt with the foreign enforcement of rights ac-
quired under stockholder's liability statutes. The first case of this type
was Converse v. Hamilton,7 which required Wisconsin to allow a suit in its
courts under a Minnesota statute imposing certain liabilities upon the stock-
holders of bankrupt Minnesota corporations.8 In this case the Court applied
the same general rule and exceptions to the statute as it does with the en-
forcement of judgments.9 Because the basis of the decision was obscure,10
it has never been regarded as a positive holding that the full faith and credit
clause applies to statutes as such. The Converse case has remained in the
background and was thought of as applying the clause, if at all, to only the one
type of statute involved in the case. The application was believed necessary
here because of the peculiar commercial relationship with which the case was
concerned.
Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to Enforcemnent of Tax Jidgments, 19 MARQ. L.
Riv. 905 (1934).
As to other defenses and requirements see Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct.
682, 54 L. Ed. 905 (1909) (finality of judgment or decree); Christmas v. Russell,
5 Wall. 290, 18 L. Ed. 475 (U.S. 1866) (judgment procured by fraud); Levin v.
Gladstein, 142 N.C. 482, 55 S.E. 371 (1906) (same).
4. ". . . It is only comparatively recently that it has been definitely held that
Article IV also requires state courts to give full faith and credit to statutes of other
states." STUMBEG , CoNFLicT or LAws 62-63 (2d ed. 1951).
5. See CooK, stpra note 3, at 421; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to
Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv. 533 (1926) ;
Jackson, supra note 3, at 3; Ross, "Fudl Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN.
L. RE V. 140 (1936).
6. ". . . Without doubt the constitutional requirement, . .. implies that the public
acts of every state shall be given the same effect by the courts of another state that
they have by law and usage at home." Waite, C. J., in Chicago & Alton R.R. v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622, 7 Sup. Ct. 398, 30 L. Ed. 519 (1887). See also
Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 18 L. Ed. 599 (U.S. 1867), which has sometimes
been interpreted as applying the clause to statutes.
7. 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749 (1912).
8. See also Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100
(1935), 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 117; Jackson, supra note 3, at 13; Note, 45 YALE L. J.
339 (1935).
9. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749 (1912).
10. Compare Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Constitution and Choice of Law, 25
WASH. L. Q. 27, 37 (1939) and Langmaid, supra note 2, at 398 with CARNAHIAN, CON-
FLICT OF LAws AND Lin INSURANCE CoNcACTs 47 (1942).
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The next group of cases has been concerned with the problems arising
in connection with fraternal benefit insurance companies. 1 Though these
holdings have likewise not been as forthright as they might have been,
it is apparent that the Court intended to make the same use of the clause here
as was done in the first group. In point of time these decisions were the
earliest involving anything approaching a wide application of the clause to
statutes, and at one time they stood almost alone in the field. Here the Court
has held that the forum must give full faith and credit to the domiciliary
charter of the company as embodied in the foreign state's statutes and the
decisions of that state construing the charter.1 2 In these holdings the Supreme
Court seems motivated by a desire to secure uniform enforcement of the
rights created under such contracts' 3 and by a recognition of the obvious
need of a commercial world that the parties be able to appraise their rights
before entering into business relations. 14 These decisions have taken on a
unique position in the law concerning the full faith and credit clause and
have given little cause for belief that any new future application of the clause
to statutes would be made. This may in part be attributed to the somewhat
unusual nature of the business organization involved.
11. E.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 Sup. Ct.
1355, 91 L. Ed. 1687 (1947) ; Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin,
305 U.S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct 35, 83 L. Ed. 45 (1938) ; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co., v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 Sup Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106 (1936) ; Modern Woodmen
of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783 (1925) ; Supreme
Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089
(1915). There is some room for leeway, however. See Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 62 Sup. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152 (1941), 42 COL. L. Rgv. 689
(1942).
Though the two cases of Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146, 38 Sup.
Ct 54, 62 L. Ed. 208 (1917) and Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct.
692, 59 L. Ed. 1165 (1915) are sometimes cited as belonging in the above group of de-
cisions, it seems more likely that these cases stressed the res judicata aspect as applied
to class actions rather than the full faith and credit that must be given to the charters
and by-laws of these companies as embodied in the statutes of the state of incorporation
and as construed by that state's courts.
In contrast to the fraternal benefit type of insurance company, the conflict of laws
situations arising in regard to the usual type of insurance company have been regulated
by the Supreme Court by the use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine & Land Co., 292 U.S. 143,
54 Sup. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178 (1934) ; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 Sup.
Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926 (1930); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 38 Sup.
Ct 337, 62 L. Ed. 772 (1918); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 34 Sup.
Ct. 879, 58 L. Ed. 1259 (1914). For a complete discussion of these cases and problems
see Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the U. S. Supreme
Court under the Due Process Clause, 22 OR. L. REv. 109 (1943).
12. It has been claimed that this amounts to giving full faith and credit to the
common law of a foreign state. See O'Meara, Constitutional Aspects of the Conflict of
Laws: Recent Developments. 27 MINN. L. REv. 500 (1943). Cf. Field, supra note 1, at
441. See also Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?
15 MmNN L. Rv. 161, 170 (1931).
13. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 542, 35 Sup. Ct.
724, 59 L. Ed. 1089 (1915).




The third line of cases deals with workman's compensation statutes.
The first decision was Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,15 which
arose when a Vermont resident who was employed in that state was killed
in the course of his employment while temporarily working in New Hamp-
shire. In a suit in the New Hampshire Federal District Court for the negli-
gent killing of the deseased, the company pleaded the Vermont statute by
way of defense. The Supreme Court upheld that contention on the ground
that New Hampshire must give full faith and credit to the Vermont act.
It was declared that this result was not giving extraterritorial effect to the
statute since these types of acts "are treated, almost universally, as creating a
statutory relation between the parties...,16
This decision, at first, appeared to be of great importance since this was
the first time that the Court had expressly held that a statute was a public
act within the meaning of the constitutional provision.' 7 However, by the
later holdings of the Court, the Bradford case has been in practical effect
limited to its own facts and is even doubtful as to these. The Supreme Court
in later similar cases has not required a state to use a foreign workman's
compensation statute in preference to its own as it did in the Bradford case.'
Consequently, the authority of this case has now been considerably weakened,
and the case itself has not been a stepping-stone to the general enforcement of
statutory rights in other states.
These three groups of cases were the only ones where this question
was decided until just recently.' 9 In Hughes v. Fetter,20 decided last June,
the Supreme Court has extended the application of the clause to still a fourth
15. 286 U.S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932), 46 HARv. L. REv. 291, 42
YAm L.J. 115.
16. Id. at 157-58.
17. Id. at 154-55. See also Beale, Social Justice and Btsiness Costs-A Study
in the Legal History of Today, 49 HAgv. L. REv. 593 (1936). The fact that Congress
has not legislated directly with respect to this has led to conjecture as to whether
or not the full faith and credit clause is self-executing as to statutes. See CARNAHAN,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 43; Jackson, supra note 3, at 11; Langmaid, supra note 2, at
388.
18. All subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court have allowed the forum to
apply its own law in dealing with workman's compensation cases regardless of the
place of making of the employment contract, the place of injury or the location of the
injured party's regular place of employment. It seems that the forum may apply
local law even though the forum's interest in the controversy is relatively slight. See
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 Sup. Ct. 801, 91 L. Ed. 1028
(1947); Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S.
493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044 (1935) ; cf. Ohio v. Chat-
tanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663, 77 L. Ed. 1307 (1933). See
STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 3, at 62; note 35 CoL. L. REv. 751 (1935).
19. See Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 214 U.S. 19,29 Sup. Ct. 601, 53 L. Ed. 892
(1909) in regard to the application of the clause to state constitutions.
20. 341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822 (1951). The opinion of the state
court which was reversed by the Supreme Court may be found in 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d
452 (1950), 64 HARv. L. Rav. 327, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 756 (1951).
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type of statutes-those creating a cause of action for wrongful death.21
Though this had been suggested a number of years ago as a means of securing
uniformity of enforcement,22 and the Court had required that full faith and
credit be given a judgment based on a wrongful death statute,2 3 it was not
until this case that full faith and credit was required for such a foreign
statutory cause of action.24 The states, following the early federal decisions, 25
have not considered themselves bound by the Constitution to allow these
suits, but have been content to decide these cases under the common law
principles of the conflict of laws.26 The modern tendency has been to permit
the action under the foreign wrongful death act,2 7 but some states have denied
recognition to such a cause of action, giving more weight to their public
policy 2S or requiring substantial similarity between their wrongful death
statute and that of the foreign state.29 The Hughes case has now affected
these rulings, and has placed some constitutional limitations on the states in
this regard.
21. For a historical account of the origin of this type of statute in the United
States see TIFFANY, DEATH By WRONGFUL ACT c. 2 (2d ed. 1913) ; Rose, Foreign En-
forcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 545 (1935).
22. Schofield, The Claim of a Federal Right to Enforce in One State the Death
Statute of Another, 3 ILL. L. REv. 65 (1908). The writer also suggested that some
use might be made of the due process clause in this regard.
23. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U.S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64 L. Ed.
638 (1920).
24. In the past when these cases were before the Supreme Court they were decidtd
purely on principles of the conflict of laws with no mention being made of the full faith
and credit clause. See Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 168 U.S. 445, 18 Sup.
Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed. 537 (1897) ; Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190,
14 Sup. Ct. 978, 38 L. Ed. 958 (1894) ; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11, 26 L. Ed.
439, (1880). Notice, however, that these cases were decided before Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), when the Court was deciding
cases under its own common law. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 13.
25. See note 24 supra.
26. Since suits for wrongful death are in tort the lex loci delicti applies, and the or-
dinary tort right is enforced unless some strong public policy of the frum forbids it. In
connection with wrongful death actions this policy has been confined mainly to the type of
damages allowed under the foreign statute as compared with that of the forum. See
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 392 (1934).
27. This modern veiw is exemplified by Judge Cardozo's opinion in Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918), which allowed a
suit for wrongful death to be brought in New York under the Massachusetts statute
which provided for damages based on defendant's culpability. Other cases showing
substantically the same attitude include Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., 205 N.C.
292, 171 S.E. 100 (1933) ; Bagley v. Small, 92 N.H. 107, 26 A.2d 23 (1942) ; Baldwin
v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412 (1945) ; Parsons v. American Trust & Bank-
ing Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1934) ; Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co.,
11 Wash. 2d 288, 11.8 P.2d 985 (1941). See also GOODRIcH, CONFLIcT OF LAv 297 (3d
ed. 1949; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 21, § 196; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 3, at
192.
28. E.g., McLay v. Slade, 48 R.I. 357, 138 A. 212 (1927). See Note, 62 A.L.R.
1330 (1929) for a careful review of the cases dealing with the penal and public policy
aspects of foreign wrongful death actions.
29. See TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 21, §§ 197-98; Rose, supra note 21, at 559;
Note, 77 A.L.R. 1311 (1932) for a collection of cases invoking the similarity rule. For
a fact situation involving a foreign country instead of a state see Slater v. Mexican Nat.
R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900 (1904).
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In the Hughes case, an administrator brought suit in Wisconsin under
the Illinois wrongful death act to recover damages for the death of his de-
cedent, who was killed in Illinois in an automobile accident. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the suit. The decision
was placed upon the ground that the Wisconsin wrongful death act gave
rise to a public policy which forbade the enforcement of all foreign wrongful
death claims.30 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this de-
cision, holding that the full faith and credit clause requires that this Wisconsin
policy must give way. The Court made it clear that this was not meant to
be an arbitrary holding, since it recognized that there was room for "con-
flicting public policies" among the states in this regard. The Court also
pointed out that there was no "real feeling of antagonism" in Wisconsin
concerning wrongful death statutes in general.31
The argument of the dissent was based primarily on the circumstance
that there was no pre-existing relationship between the parties as there had
been in the earlier groups of cases. Because of this, it was argued that there
was no need for any fixed rule which would inform the parties of their rights
in advance of any transaction they might enter into.32 However, the majority
opinion does not seem concerned with enabling the parties to determine their
rights and obligations at the time they enter into a contractual relationship;
but, on the contrary, appears to be more interested in the aiding of parties to
secure uniform treatment regardless of where they happen to bring suit.8a3
Furthermore, it was urged by the dissenting opinion that since this was a
cause of action and not a defense, enforcement might be declined in the
forum state as no rights would be impaired; the plaintiff must simply bring
his suit elsewhere.34 This disregards the fact that the plaintiff may not al-
ways be able to get service of process on the defendant in another jurisdic-
tion or that the defendant may have assets in only one jurisdiction. This
result might very well work a severe hardship on the plaintiff in many
instances.
30. Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950).
31. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black, and the dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter who was joined by Justices Reed, Jackson and
Minton.
32. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 617-18, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822 (1951).
33. This was the main purpose of the full faith and credit clause. "It was the
purpose of that provision to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public
acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in
others." Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210, 62 Sup. Ct. 241, 86
L. Ed. 152 (1941). See Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27
YALE L.J. 656 (1918), where the cases denying a right of action on a foreign wrongful
death act are criticised and said to be against the policy of the full faith and credit clause.
34. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 618, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822 (1951),
quoting from Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160, 52 Sup. Ct.
571, 76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932), where it was said by Mr. Justice Brandeis that "A State
may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In so doing, it merely
denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free
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It is not clear from the opinion how broad is the principle on which the
Hughes case is based. In its narrowest form the decision stands for the
proposition that a state may not categorically refuse to enforce all causes of
action based on the wrongful death acts of sister states. Whether the same
holding will be reached in cases of a limited or restricted refusal to enforce
only certain wrongful death claims remains to be seen.
The problem was raised, however, in the later case of First National
Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines,35 decided by a United States court of
appeals last July. Under facts similar to those in Hughes, an executor of a
deceased Illinois resident brought suit in a federal district court in Illinois
under the Utah wrongful death act for the deceased's death in Utah while
aboard one of defendant's airliners. The defendant was doing business in
Illinois and also had an agent for the service of process in Utah. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit, citing Hughes v. Fetter
in the opinion. The decision was based on the fact that the Illinois wrongful
death act, unlike the Wisconsin act, does not "exclude all foreign wrongful
death actions but only those as to which 'a right of action ... exists under
the laws of the place where such death occurred and service of process ...
may be had upon the defendant in such place.'"36 Since the plaintiff
executor was capable of reducing his claim to judgment in Utah, Illinois
forbade the suit in its courts
37
The court of appeals felt that by requiring the plaintiff to bring his
suit in Utah a more orderly administration of justice in Illinois could be
had.3 8  It has been forcefully argued that this is a wasteful and expensive
procedure, contrary to the purposes of the full faith and credit clause. 9
Furthermore, Illinois may still have to entertain a suit based on the judgment
in Utah since the defendant's assets may not be sufficient in the latter state
to satisfy the judgment obtained. The United Airlines case definitely does
to enforce it elsewhere." See also Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct.
338, 74 L. Ed. 926 (1930) (defendant's defense required to be permitted under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Compare the language of Mr. Justice
Stone in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 547,
55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044 (1935) : "The necessity is not any the less whether the
statute and policy of the forum is set up as a defense to a suit brought under the
foreign statute or the foreign statute is set up as a defense to a suit or proceedings under
the local statute." See also Field, supra note 1, at 447.
35. 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951).
36. Id. at 494-95.
37. If the plaintiff recovers a judgment in Utah, he can, of course, sue on it in
Illinois. Presumably Illinois could not have any objection to this procedure. See
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U.S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 65 L.Ed. 638
(1920).
38. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines, 190 F.2d 493, 495 (7th Cir.
1951).
39. Mr. Justice Jackson, one of the dissenters in the Hughes case, had this to say
in 1945: "But the full faith and credit clause is the foundation of any hope we may have
for a truly national system of justice, based on the preservation but better integration
of the local jurisdictions we have." Jackson, supra note 3, at 34. See also note 33 supra.
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not follow the "uniform enforcement of vested rights" 40 approach which
seems to be the underlying basis of the Hughes decision. An answer from
the Supreme Court may soon be forthcoming since it has decided to review
the case.41 This may be taken as an indication that the Court will clarify its
position. It most certainly shows that the Court regards this as an important
problem regardless of the result it may reach in its decision. It is not un-
likely that the Court will reverse the decision of the court of appeals as being
inconsistent with the principles announced in Hughes v. Fetter.
Suppose the forum state declines to enforce a foreign wrongful death
act because it differs in some material aspect from its own statute? In the
past this has been the main ground on which the state courts have based
their rulings refusing to enforce these statutes. The states using this basis
of refusal have generally held that some substantial similarity must be found
between the two acts before enforcement would be permitted.42  It is likely
that the Court will give more consideration to this ground of refusal because
of these previous state decisions. Since there are no decisions of the Court
on this question, the final answer is as yet very much in doubt.
No certain answer is available, also, when the forum characterizes the
foreign statute as penal and refuses to enforce it on this ground. Questions
concerning the penal nature of wrongful death acts generally arise in con-
nection with the manner in which damages are assessed-e.g., where they
are limited or where they are based upon the degree of culpability of the
defendant rather than the injuries to the deceased or his family. Since the
Supreme Court has often said that the full faith and credit clause does not
require enforcement of judgments based on penal laws,43 it may well be that
the same application will be made in the case of statutes. If such is the
case, it seems likely that the Court will determine for itself when the foreign
statute is penal.
Can a forum refuse to enforce a foreign wrongful death act under the
principle of forum non conveniens. In the Hughes case the Supreme Court
did not say what effect its decision would have upon that doctrine where its
application would deny enforcement to a public act of another state.44 The
40. This phrase is borrowed from Professor Beach, supra note 33.
41. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3123 (U.S.
Nov. 13, 1951) (certiorari granted).
.42. See note 29 supra.
43. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123
(1892) ; Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L.
Ed. 239 (1888) ; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 21; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 3, at
118. But compare Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229,
80 L. Ed. 220 (1935), which required enforcement of a judgment based on a revenue
law, thus weakening the rule forbidding enforcement of judgments based on penal laws.
44. "The Wisconsin policy, moreover, cannot be considered as an application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine, whatever effect that doctrine might be given if its
use resulted in denying enforcement to public acts of another state." Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609, 612-13, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822 (1951).
[ VOL,. 5
impression is given, however, that a valid application will in most cases cause
no disturbance with the normal procedure. The doctrine will presumably
have some limiting effect on the full faith and credit clause.
45
Will the holding in the Hughes case be extended to include problems
of choice of law-problems wherein the forum must choose between two or
more states for the source of the law which will be applied to the facts and
control the legal relations of the parties? Actually neither the Hughes nor
the United Airlines cases involved a choice of law problem. The wrongful
act, injury and death all occurred in one state so that the question was
whether the proper law could be enforced in the forum rather than what
was the proper law to apply. There is no indication in the Hughes opinion
that the Court is interested in the connection of the full faith and credit
clause with this situation. It is not unlikely that the Court will concern itself
with this question in the future, since in previous cases it has used the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of securing proper
choice of law.48 Furthermore, the Bradford case presented a choice of law
problem which the Court necessarily decided when it held that New Hamp-
shire was required to give full faith and credit to the Vermont statute.
Will the doctrine of the Hughes case be expanded to include other types
of statutes besides wrongful death statutes? The majority of the Court did
not limit its holding to wrongful death acts, and the decision was reached
in spite of the limiting argument of the dissent. On the other hand, some
of the justices may have felt that this case was the limit to which an applica-
tion of the clause could be carried. If the "uniform enforcement of vested
rights" is the goal of the Court and the Constitution, it can most easily be
accomplished by including other types of statutes within the scope of the
clause.
47
Another means of securing uniformity of enforcement is by a further
extension of the Hughes case and the earlier decisions to include the common
law of the sister states within the "public Acts" phrase of the clause. The
Court seemed to be reaching this result with the fraternal insurance cases
when it held that full faith and credit must be given to the decisions of the
45. It is possible that the United Airlines case may be treated as an application
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It may be more convenient to try the suit
in Utah, the place of the wrongful act, since all the witnesses will presumably be found
there. Furthermore, defendant may be served with process in Utah.
46. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine & Land Co., 292 U.S.
143, 54 Sup. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178 (1934); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926 (1930). Hilpert and Cooley, supra note 10, at 46.
47. Some of the suggested statutes which might be included within the scope of
the full faith and credit clause are those relating to marriage and divorce, those imposing
liability upon nonresident car owners where the car is driven in the state by the non-
resident's bailee and fiscal laws of sister states. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 13;
Note, 45 YALE L.J. 339 (1935).
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